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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its ROAD 
COMMISSION, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
GEORGE KENDELL and IRENE H. KEN-
DELL, his wife; EARL M. KENDELL, and 
FLORA H. KENDELL, his wife; RULON 
E. WILLIAMS and VIOLA R. WILLIAMS, 
his wife; and UTAH SAND AND GRAVEL 
PRODUCTS CORPORATION, a Utah cor-
poration, 
Respondents. 
Case No. 
10834 
SUPPLIMENTAL 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
A. Distinction Between Police Power Regulation 
and Taking by Condemnation 
In connection with the principle raised in 
Point II, it should be pointed out that the trial 
court erred in the admission of evidence per-
taining to profits and loss thereof following the 
erection of the wire fence which altered the 
access of the business customers of defendant. 
(See Tr. 9, 15, 16, 17 a_nd particularly 56 and 4S-
50.) 
It is well established in the State of Utah 
that a state has full power to adjust access from 
private property to a public thoroughfare. See 
Springville Banking v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100, 349 
P.2d 157 (1960); State v. Parker, 13 U.2d 65 (1962); 
and particularly in point, Weber Basin Water 
Conservancy District v. Hilsop, 12 U.2d 64, 362 
P.2d 580 (1961); Utah Railroad Commission v. 
Hansen, 14 U.2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); Sine ·v. 
Helland, 18 U.2d 222, 418 p.2d 979 0966). 
See also an interesting annotation in 91 
A.LR.2d 963. (The case of Sprinville Banking 
Co. v. Burton, supra. is cited in the annotation) 
In this case, the overriding principle be-
fore the court is whether or not the State of 
Utah can adjust an access-way to and from pri-
vate property to a public thoroughfare, even 
though such adjustment results in a diminution 
in the market value of said private property. 
It is readily conceded that the State must 
pay for a "taking" of private property for public 
use, (see Article I, Section 22, Constitution of 
Utah), but in such instances, the State only 
must pay for the reduction in the value of the 
property taken by virtue of its exercise of the 
power of eminent domain. It is equally true, a.s 
the cases above have uniformly pointed out, 
that the State by the exercise of its police pow-
ers in the regulation use of private property, 
even tho'.Jgh such regulation impairs rights in 
property and significantly reduces the free ex-
ercise of the rights in said property by its 
owner. 
If the public interest is served thereby no 
damages are recoverable. It therefore follows 
that the trial judge was in error in admitting 
evidence relating to the reduction of business 
to defendants occ-:Jsioned by the erection of the 
wire fence, adjacent to the new freeway. 
If the courts allow the defendants in this 
case to submit evidence regarding the reduc-
tion of business occasioned by the construction 
of said fence, the effect thereof is to overrule 
the Springville Banking case and all other Utah 
jurisprudence. 
B. Waiver 
It is strongly urged by Respondent that the 
Appellant in this case is now foreclosed from 
raising the error of the trial court on appeal. 
At the trial court level, appellant herein sub-
mitted Instruction No. 12 (see Transcript p. 28-A). 
It is conceded that the wording of said instruc-
tion does not precisely verbalize the principal 
of law used by Appellant as a basis for reversal 
in this case. However, the substance of the re-
uested instruction which was denied by the 
trial judge contained the same legal precept 
here contended for. 
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In addition thereto, the Appellant, after 
learning of the verdict and judgment rendered 
thereon, filed a motion for a remitteur, and 
shortly thereafter filed a motion for a new trial 
alleging as a reason thereafter the same reason 
that is asserted under Point II in Appellant's 
Brief. Appellant certainly can be said to have 
cured any asserted a.cquiescence to the admis-
sion of said prejudicial evidence by the De-
fendant-Respondents. 
Appellant, in support of the motion for new 
trial, submitted to the trial court and counsel a 
trial brief (see Transcript p. 36) which delineates 
the same notions which are advanced here. It 
is strongly urge dthat the application of the ex-
ception to doctrine of waiver incorporated in 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 51 has been fully 
complied with in this case when it is consid-
ered that the State stands to lose $40,000, plus 
interest, from the date of judgment if this award 
is allowed to stand. 
It would be unreasonable and inequitable 
to apply the doctrine of waiver in this case con-
sidering ( 1) the fact that a new trial was con-
vened and the court had before it the theory 
on which this appeal is based. In addition there-
to, the unjust resnlt which would accrue in the 
event the escape hatch which Rule 51, Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides is not em-
ployed by this court would be unconscionable 
and in direct conflict wtih the long standing 
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position taken by this court in cases in-
distinguishable on their facts. If the theory of 
the Defendant-Respondents is allowed to stand 
in this case they would be able to accomplish 
indirectly what this court and the overwhelm-
ing majority of respectable american jurisdic-
tions have prohibited. A concrete fact situation 
may be used for illustration; Assume: (1) Appel-
lant placed the fence in question in the exact 
place where it actually was located five years 
prior to the condemnation action and subse-
quent highway construction. (2) A condemna-
tion action is commenced five years following 
the erection of said fence along exactly the 
same route which the State actually used in 
this case. It couldn't be argued that the estab-
lishment of the fence by the State wasn't a legi-
timate exercise of its police power in so regulat-
ing the flow of traffic. It could not be doubted 
that defendants would have any legitimate 
claim as against the State for damages by virtue 
of such legitimate regulation. Therefore, it is 
only by the fortuitous circumstance of the coin-
cidental establishment of the fence and the tak-
ing which distinguishes this case from the long 
line of well-reasoned opinions from this court 
denying compensation for exactly the same 
type of regulation for which defendant de-
mands damages herein. Indeed, it would seem 
that if the court allows this judgment to stand, 
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it is in effect enacting a "private of special law 
. . . where a general law (could) be applica-
ble • • • II 
CONCLUSION 
The record reveals clearly that a plethora of in-
admissable and highly prejudicial evidence was ad-
mitted at the trial level. The conclusion is irresistible 
considering the Jury's award that the inadmissablE 
evidence was strongly considered in arriving at the 
verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
STEPHEN L. JOHNSTON, 
Special Assistant Attorney 
General 
431 South 3rd East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
